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Helps measure the concentration of trust roots in a skill's attestation graph — identifying monoculture risk where a single compromised root invalidates an e...

开发与 DevOps

许可证:MIT-0

MIT-0 ·免费使用、修改和重新分发。无需归因。

版本:v1.0.0

统计:⭐ 0 · 307 · 0 current installs · 0 all-time installs

0

安装量(当前) 0

🛡 VirusTotal :良性 · OpenClaw :良性

Package:andyxinweiminicloud/attestation-root-diversity-analyzer

安全扫描(ClawHub)

  • VirusTotal :良性
  • OpenClaw :良性

OpenClaw 评估

The skill's stated purpose (measuring attestation root diversity) aligns with its instructions and requirements; it is an instruction-only analyzer that may fetch attestation metadata using curl/python3 but does not request unrelated credentials or install additional software.

目的

The skill's name and description match the operations described in SKILL.md: parsing attestation graphs, computing concentration metrics, and producing a diversity verdict. Required binaries (curl, python3) are reasonable for fetching and processing attestation metadata. No unrelated credentials, config paths, or heavy dependencies are requested.

说明范围

SKILL.md is focused on analyzing trust graphs and gives examples; it does not instruct the agent to read arbitrary local files or secret env vars. However, because the skill is instruction-only and lists curl/python3 as required, the runtime behavior implies network fetches of attestation metadata (via curl) and local processing (via python3). The SKILL.md does not enumerate specific endpoints to contact or include code, so you should expect t…

安装机制

There is no install spec and no code files. This is the lowest-risk form: nothing is written to disk by an installer. The skill relies on existing system binaries only.

证书

The skill declares no environment variables, no credentials, and no config paths. That is proportionate to its stated purpose. If you plan to analyze attestations that are behind authenticated endpoints, those credentials would need to be provided externally (the skill does not request them).

持久

always is false and the skill does not request persistent system changes or privileges. Autonomous invocation is allowed (platform default), which is appropriate for a tool that performs analyses on demand.

综合结论

This skill looks internally consistent: it analyzes attestation graphs and reasonably needs curl/python3 to fetch and process metadata. Before installing, consider: 1) Source provenance — the skill's source/homepage is unknown; prefer skills with a traceable source. 2) Network fetches — the skill implies using curl to pull attestation data; confirm which endpoints the agent will query and run it in a network-isolated environment if you have st…

安装(复制给龙虾 AI)

将下方整段复制到龙虾中文库对话中,由龙虾按 SKILL.md 完成安装。

请把本段交给龙虾中文库(龙虾 AI)执行:为本机安装 OpenClaw 技能「Attestation Root Diversity Analyzer」。简介:Helps measure the concentration of trust roots in a skill's attestation graph —…。
请 fetch 以下地址读取 SKILL.md 并按文档完成安装:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/openclaw/skills/refs/heads/main/skills/andyxinweiminicloud/attestation-root-diversity-analyzer/SKILL.md
(来源:yingzhi8.cn 技能库)

SKILL.md

打开原始 SKILL.md(GitHub raw)

---
name: attestation-root-diversity-analyzer
description: >
  Helps measure the concentration of trust roots in a skill's attestation
  graph — identifying monoculture risk where a single compromised root
  invalidates an entire chain that appears to have multiple validators.
version: 1.0.0
metadata:
  openclaw:
    requires:
      bins: [curl, python3]
      env: []
    emoji: "🌐"
---

# The Attestation Chain Has Seven Links. They All Trace Back to One Root.

> Helps identify when a skill's trust chain is structurally fragile — not because individual links are weak, but because all paths converge on a single root that one compromise can invalidate.

## Problem

A skill with five attestation badges looks more trustworthy than a skill with one. But if four of those five badges trace back through the same root attestor, the effective trust diversity is closer to two than to five. The appearance of multiple independent validators is real; the independence is not.

This is a topology problem, not a cryptography problem. A trust graph where all paths converge on a single root is not a distributed trust system — it's a hub-and-spoke system wearing the visual appearance of a mesh. A hub-and-spoke system has all the failure properties of centralized trust: compromise the hub, and every spoke-rooted badge becomes invalid simultaneously.

The risk is not hypothetical. Self-attesting roots — where the publisher is also the root attestor, or where multiple attestation badges trace back to a single organization — are common in ecosystems where attestation is new and infrastructure is thin. A skill from a well-known publisher that has also reviewed its own dependencies through affiliated validators presents structural fragility even if every individual attestation is cryptographically correct.

Measuring this requires looking at the full trust graph, not just the badges at the leaves.

## What This Analyzes

This analyzer examines attestation root diversity across five dimensions:

1. **Root concentration index** — What fraction of the attestation graph's trust paths converge on each distinct root? A Herfindahl-style concentration measure identifies whether trust is effectively distributed or structurally centralized
2. **Self-attestation detection** — Does the skill's publisher appear anywhere in its own trust chain? Self-attestation is not inherently invalid, but it must be disclosed and weighted appropriately
3. **Organizational diversity** — Are the distinct roots associated with independent organizations, or do multiple roots trace back to the same controlling entity through different organizational names?
4. **Effective validator count** — After accounting for convergence, how many truly independent validators contribute to the skill's trust score? A skill with 12 badges from 3 organizations has an effective count of 3, not 12
5. **Structural fragility score** — If the highest-concentration root were compromised, what percentage of the skill's attestation graph would be invalidated?

## How to Use

**Input**: Provide one of:
- A skill identifier with its attestation metadata
- A trust graph (validator chain, root identifiers) to analyze
- Two skills to compare relative root concentration

**Output**: A root diversity report containing:
- Root concentration index (0 = fully distributed, 1 = single root)
- Attestation graph visualization (text-based)
- Self-attestation flags
- Organizational diversity assessment
- Effective validator count
- Structural fragility score
- Diversity verdict: DISTRIBUTED / CONCENTRATED / MONOCULTURE / SELF-ATTESTING

## Example

**Input**: Analyze attestation root diversity for `workflow-automator` skill

```
🌐 ATTESTATION ROOT DIVERSITY ANALYSIS

Skill: workflow-automator
Attestation badges: 7
Audit timestamp: 2025-04-20T14:00:00Z

Trust graph structure:
  Badge A → Validator-1 → Root-Alpha (publisher-org)
  Badge B → Validator-2 → Root-Alpha (publisher-org)
  Badge C → Validator-3 → Root-Alpha (publisher-org)
  Badge D → Validator-4 → Root-Beta (third-party)
  Badge E → Validator-5 → Root-Beta (third-party)
  Badge F → Validator-6 → Root-Alpha (publisher-org)  ← affiliate
  Badge G → Validator-7 → Root-Gamma (community)

Root concentration analysis:
  Root-Alpha (publisher-org): 4/7 paths (57%) → publisher + 3 affiliated validators
  Root-Beta (third-party): 2/7 paths (29%)
  Root-Gamma (community): 1/7 paths (14%)

Herfindahl index: 0.57² + 0.29² + 0.14² = 0.42
  (0 = perfect distribution, 1 = single root)
  Classification: CONCENTRATED (threshold: >0.33 = concentrated)

Self-attestation: ⚠️ DETECTED
  Root-Alpha is publisher-org — publisher attests to its own skill
  3 of 7 badges trace directly to publisher-controlled validators

Organizational diversity:
  Distinct organizations: 3 (publisher-org, third-party, community)
  Effective independent: 2 (publisher-org counts as 1 despite 4 paths)
  Effective validator count: 2.4 (weighted by independence)

Structural fragility:
  If Root-Alpha were compromised: 4/7 badges (57%) invalidated
  Residual trust: Root-Beta (29%) + Root-Gamma (14%) = 43%

Diversity verdict: CONCENTRATED
  7 badges with 3 roots, but effective independence is 2.4 validators.
  Root-Alpha concentration exceeds recommended threshold for high-impact
  skills. Self-attestation by publisher reduces independence further.

Recommended actions:
  1. Require minimum 2 non-publisher roots for full DISTRIBUTED status
  2. Disclose self-attestation presence in badge display
  3. Weight Root-Alpha badges at 0.5× for concentration-aware scoring
  4. Target Root-Gamma growth to reduce Alpha concentration below 0.33
```

## Related Tools

- **attestation-chain-auditor** — Validates chain integrity and completeness; root diversity analyzer measures whether that chain's roots are structurally independent
- **transparency-log-auditor** — Checks whether signing events are independently auditable; diverse roots are more valuable when each root's behavior is logged
- **publisher-identity-verifier** — Verifies publisher identity; publisher as self-attesting root is a specific concentration risk to flag
- **trust-velocity-calculator** — Quantifies trust decay rate; concentrated attestation graphs decay faster when a root is compromised

## Limitations

Root diversity analysis requires access to the full attestation graph, including the organizational relationships between validators — data that many current marketplaces do not expose. Where only the leaf badges are visible and root relationships must be inferred, the analysis is necessarily approximate. Organizational independence is difficult to verify programmatically: two organizations with different names may share effective control. The Herfindahl-based concentration measure is a useful heuristic, not a definitive security assessment — the appropriate threshold depends on the risk profile of the capability being attested. A concentrated attestation graph is a structural concern, not a confirmation of compromise; it means the trust infrastructure is more fragile, not that it has already failed.